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Pierre Manent and the Dialectics
of Augustine's The City of God
Marc D. Guerra
Assumption College

M

will be taken from the French Catholic
political philosopher Pierre Manent's latest book, a genuine tour
de force of theologico-political reflection, titled Metamorphoses
of the City. 1 Works of genuine theologico-political reflection like those
found in Augustine's magisterial The City of God or Baruch Spinoza's
influential Theological-Political Treatise are increasingly difficult for late
modem human beings to grasp, even when they are set forth in the bright
light of day. Inasmuch as they do not advance a familiar and immediately
identifiable academic or political parti pris, they are not sectarian or
ideological in the now all too familiar sense of those terms. For this reason,
they tend to appear unfamiliar and unfinished, if not, to use Nietzsche's
term, "untimely" to human beings who have grown accustomed to hearing
religious and political claims couched in the terms of dogmatically
formulated ideologies. Manent's Metamorphoses is undoubtedly a work of
theologico-political reflection.
Manent's Metamorphoses introduces a relatively new field of study.
Unlike works of classical political philosophy such as Aristotle's Politics,
Metamorphoses does not present a study of regimes, the kind of
authoritative political constitutions - monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy,
oligarchy, mixed regime, democracy - that can organize life in the political
order. Rather, Manent offers us a study of the political form, that is, the
prior, broader organizing political idea within which the regime and
political life ultimately takes shape and operates. Manent identifies four
political forms in the history of the West: the polis, the empire, the Church,
and the nation. Each of these forms is a way of holding things in common
in the world of human affairs. As Manent says in his introduction, his
concern with the political form grew out of his seeing more and more
clearly the significance of "the prodigious innovation" in human life "that
Y
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countenance the brutality of Thomas Hobbes that simplifies things in the
name of solidity and expediency. To cite Manent, "whereas Thomas
Hobbes rebuffs a ridiculous vanity, the Christian critique is concerned to
reveal noble error, where the accent can fall either on the nobility of the
error or the erroneous character of the noble movement. One finds in
Augustine at times one, at times the other accent. " 8
Manent sees Christianity's deepest point of impact on the political
order affecting our understanding of the problem of the one and the many.
Christianity's teaching on the universal way of deliverance and salvation in
Christ opposes not social or political inequality per se, that is, the
perceived great demon that modem liberal democracies increasingly seek
to slay, but the pertinence of Greek philosophy's exaggerated distinction
between the philosopher and the nonphilosopher, with regard to a human
being's capacity to attain or receive the truth. While to the pagan elite the
mysteries are shrouded in secrecy and meant for initiates only, the
Christian mysteries are offered publicly, ostensibly to everyone. In a word,
in Christianity there is no "secret doctrine." Thus over the philosophers,
Augustine has the advantage of the liberty or boldness of speech of the
Christian apostle who offers the same salutary truth to all. I will come back
to this point later. Here, I want to emphasize Manent's undeniable
appreciation of Catholicism's unflinchingly dialectical approach to this
question. When conjugating the problem of the one and the many,
Catholicism does not engage in an easygoing and formulaic
ancient/modem two-step, siding simply or instinctively with classical
thought over and against modem thought on all things. Rather, working out
of its own distinctive claim about the true nature of things, Catholicism
engages in what I like to call a dual dialectic - one dialectic between
premodem and modem political philosophy, and one dialectic between
classical philosophy and Catholic theology about the truth about God and
man.
Returning to Manent' s reflection on Augustine's argument in The City
of God, Manent places great importance on the fact that unlike the readily
surveyed polis, to use Aristotle's phrase, or the panoramic empire or the
discernibly identifiable nation-state, the two cities Augustine describes are
not visibly separated. Certainly, the Church is in one sense and in one part
visible. But we must make this important qualification: Among the
Church's most sworn enemies are concealed its future citizens, and even
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among its most sworn enemies lie hidden predestined friends, who as yet
do not know themselves. On the other hand, among those who appear to be
in the Church are some who will not have a share in the eternal destiny of
the saints. As Augustine arrestingly states in the opening book of The City
of God, "in truth, those two cities are interwoven and intermixed in this era,
and await separation at the last judgment. " 9
As Augustine memorably states, these two cities, the earthly city and
the city of God, "were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was
created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly
City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of self." 10 One city
seeks its glory from men, the other takes God as witness of its conscience
is its greatest glory. One city is dominated by the passion to dominate,
while in the other mutual service is rendered by charity, the rulers by
ruling, and the subjects by obeying. One city, in its masters, loves its own
strength, while the other says to God, "I will love you, Lord, my strength."
Manent offers a rich analysis of Augustine's portraits of the fratricides
that marked the earthly birth of the earthly city and the mythic birth of
Rome as a way of highlighting the contrast just mentioned. Outwardly
similar, these two fratricides are in truth quite different. The legendary
founding of Rome began with Romulus killing his brother Remus. As
Augustine makes clear, Romulus and Remus were clearly both citizens of
the earthly city: both sought the glory of establishing the Roman state. But
the two brothers jointly could not receive as much glory as one could
receive on his own. For in the earthly city, to share glory is to diminish
one's own glory. Expounding on this theme, Manent notes that in the
earthly city the "attainment of the greatest glory, the glory attached to tota
dominatio," is the spoil of the man who rules alone. 11
The tale of Romulus and Remus is undoubtedly deplorable, but in the
end it is a rather simple tale since it is a tale of rival brothers who coveted
the same earthly good. The case of Cain and Abel, as Augustine shows, is
far more complex and thus far more interesting. In Manent's reading of
Augustine, Augustine suggests that Cain killed his brother Abel because
"he envied his brother who was good." 12 Cain envied his brother Abel even
though Abel, choosing the life of a shepherd and not a farmer like Cain,
was willing to let his brother have all the earthly goods he desired.
Augustine speaks of "the diabolical envy that the wicked feel for the good
simply because they are good, while they are themselves evil." 13 The point
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is not so much Cain's wickedness, but Abel's goodness. The sinful Cain
hates what ought to be the natural object of his love, his brother's goodness
and through that what is truly good in itself. According to Manent, "the
rivalry between Romulus and Remus expresses the division within the
earthly city, which is divided against itself. With Cain and Abel, the
conflict between the two cities comes to light. At the common source of the
two divisions or conflicts is the depraved human will, sin." 14 Christianity
thus highlights a tension that marks human life as we know it by
simultaneously affirming the desirability of human unity and the sharing of
what is truly good for human beings and emphasizing the divisive effects
of the fallen human will which ensures that men cannot ultimately act or be
righteous on their own.
It is significant, I believe, that in his chapter on "The Two Cities"
Manent quotes the following remark by Augustine twice: "The human race
is, more than any other species, at once social by nature and quarrelsome
by perversion." 15 The problem with man as we know him, according to
Christianity, if I may put it this way, is with his history, specifically his
history as a fallen creature with a rational appetite, not with his nature.
Man's created nature is good; it is his sinfulness, his suffering from what
Augustine calls the twin effects of original sin, ignorance and difficulty,
which inclines to him evil. The two parts of this thesis are of a piece for
Augustine. Augustine's very definition of a bad will is that it perverts a
nature that is good or capable of being good. In Manent's words, "the
ambivalence of the human being divided between friendship and hostility
is rooted on the one hand in the good nature of the human soul and on the
other in the fallen condition of the human being; it is rooted in the 'nature
vitiated by sin. "' 16 Hence, for Augustine, the term that best seems to allow
these two ideas to be held together is not corruption but wound: Human
nature is "wounded in the natural powers proper to it." 17
Yet Manent realizes that as powerful and illuminating as Augustine's
analysis of the fallen condition of man is, it only emphasizes the political
problem man faces when the Christian dispensation is taken into
consideration. For Augustine's searching insight hardly helps us to order
life in common in a concrete, actionable way. In Manent's view, this partly
explains why men like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke would so radically
simplify the complex and tension-ridden analysis Augustine gives in the
name of advancing the modem political program. Manent notes that the
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Augustinian knot that joins a sociable nature and an unsociable will and
that only the grace of God could untie is cut by the human institution. For
Augustine, hatred has to be healed. For Hobbes, it is enough to master
hostility. The sovereign State will take care of that. Such is the moral
simplification that makes modem political philosophy trenchantly
effective. This philosophy, the philosophy of human rights, presupposes
human unsociability, a morally neutral unsociability. 18

But the contrast between Augustine and Hobbes on this question is not
the whole story. One needs to look at the classical side of the equation as
well. Manent observes that while Greek philosophers such as Aristotle,
especially in his Ethics, were wont, at least exoterically, to show human
virtue victorious or shining triumphantly on its own, Augustine is more apt
to show man visibly struggling with virtue, to show human virtue engaged
in a dramatic battle that it is seems constantly to be on the verge of losing.
Manent states, "this is the case in particular of temperance, the virtue
especially in charge, I dare say, of the war against the weakness of the
flesh, a war we cannot win by our own forces and for which we must ask
the help of God." 19 Though he does not reference it here specifically, it is
difficult to believe that Manent did not have book 8, chapter 12 of
Augustine's Confessions in mind as he wrote this passage.
We are now in a position to appreciate what Manent sees as the
political import of Augustine's argument in The City of God. Unlike many
modem Christian thinkers ranging from the Protestant theologian Reinhold
Neibuhr to the Catholic political theorist Robert Kraynak, Manent does not
see Augustine offering a political program or even an actionable political
template in The City of God. As illuminating as Augustine's treatment of
the twin histories of the earthly city and the city of God are, and as
instructive as Augustine's account of the invisible and seemingly
intermingled terrestrial existence of these two cities is, his teaching does
not provide a political model that is, to use Manent's preferred term,
"operational." Manent is emphatic about this. At the end of the day, the
argument about the two cities Augustine advances in The City of God
makes abundantly clear that there is no history of the education of the
human race, one could say, except in the measure that there is a sacred
history, that is, a history of a holy people called to communion with God
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and held in communion by God. To cite Manent again on this fundamental
point, "the final education of humanity requires that the revelation of the
truth become a truly universal way (universalis via) that does not belong as
such to a particular nation but has been granted to all the nations to be
common to them. " 20
According to Manent, if we employ the scientific classifications of
classical philosophy, we can say that Augustine's teaching on the two cities
in The City of God is
neither practical nor theoretical. ... [H]is concern is to arouse a specific
disposition, half practical since it concerns evaluating human behavior and
half theoretical since it is constituted by a "view" of the human condition
on earth that does not change. . . . [I]t is a disposition that incites us to
desire to enter into the city of God, but it is not certain that it helps us
much to orient ourselves in the city of people. 21

In sum, the solution to the problem of human living that Augustine sets
forth in The City of God is fundamentally transpolitical. In fact, as Manent

notes, it was their dissatisfaction with the perceived irresponsibility and
impracticalness of this transpolitical solution that first moved early modem
philosophers like Hobbes to mock and reject Christianity's solution in the
name of finally resolving the unavoidable problem of ordering life in the
earthly city. In the wake of the Christian dispensation, modem political
philosophy audaciously claimed to be able to finally quiet the tensions in
the human soul and in the human person - tensions that have pulled (and
will always pull) men between the universal and the particular, the love of
one's own and the love of what is good, the temporal and the eternal.
Let me conclude with a somewhat lengthy footnote. Near the end of his
chapter on "The Two Cities," Manent entertains what is, I think, Leo
Strauss's fundamental objection to Christianity's tension-ridden
formulation of the relationship between the legitimate ends of the earthly
city and those of the city of God - and therewith to Christianity's
formulation of the theologico-political problem tout court. Manent is one
of the small but growing number of Catholic thinkers who have both
seriously and carefully engaged the wide range of Strauss' s thought and
learned from the twentieth-century political philosopher. However, we
must note Manent is a critical but respectful student of Strauss.
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Manent takes book 10 of The City of God as his point of departure in
this engagement with Strauss. In that book, Augustine critically examines
Porphyry's thought on what the Neoplatonist saw as the tightly knitted
problem that man's embodiment poses to human existence and human
happiness. Manent cites Augustine response to Porphyry's tri,, compartmentalized solution to this problem, a solution that ultimately
fractures the unified human being into a body, an intellectual soul, and a
spiritual soul. Augustine concluded his subtle theological response to
Porphyry's claim by stating that
this is the way which purifies the whole man and prepares his mortal being
for immortality, in all the elements which constitute a man. We have not
to seek one purification for that element which Porphyry calls the
"intellectual" soul, another for the "spiritual," and yet another for the
body itself It was to avoid such quests that our Purifier and Savior, the
true Purifier and the all-powerful Savior, took upon him the man in his
entirety. 22

After drawing attention to Augustine's remark, Manent notes a
similarity between the role that the Jewish people and Greek philosophy
played in the development of humanity. Both the formation of the Jewish
people and Greek philosophy, he remarks, constituted decisive qualitative
progress in the relative "self-awareness" of humanity. This progress,
·. however, came at the expense of a rupture or a separation within humanity.
i According to Manent, the "separation or rupture between the people of
?~ God and the 'nations' and the separations or rupture between the
· philosopher or wise man and the 'vulgar,' the latter deriving from the
separation and even the rupture between soul and body that is the condition
and achievement of philosophy." 23 Through these separations humanity,
, \ Manent argues, was raised a level. Manent goes on to state that
"Christianity preserves or confirms the advances achieved by these two
· ' ruptures while it overcomes them by restoring human unity on a higher
,plane through the mediation of the God-man,"24 Jesus Christ.
Strauss saw this restoration as the result of a synthesis between the
demands of obedience held out by Judaism's divine law and the life of
unencumbered inquiry held out by Plato's portrayal of the philosopher par
:excellence, Socrates. For Strauss, the alleged Christian synthesis necessarily
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comes at the expense of transforming and destroying what is most
distinctive and choiceworthy, according to the Hebrew bible and Greek
philosophy, of Jerusalem and Athens.
Manent offers what he describes as an Augustinian-inspired partial
response to Strauss's objection. Manent understands this response to be
partial, in part because it depends on acknowledging the truth of
Christianity's divinely revealed claim about the nature of man and the
nature of God and the kind of graced communion that God offers to man
through the Incarnation and in the Kingdom of God. But Manent also
recognizes that this response is partial inasmuch as it speaks about what
would have to be true about human perfection if a creature with a rational
appetite like man were actually to attain, not just seek or quest for, human
wholeness and human perfection. Bearing this in mind, Manent points out
that Strauss' s formulation posits as humanly necessary a separation
"against which something in the human being" must unavoidably and
necessarily protest in the name of the human being himself. 25 Hence, he
asks, "why would the immense majority of humanity not know the Law of
the true God or in any case be excluded from its benefits . . . and how
could . . . wisdom," that which man's desire to know seeks to possess, in
the end "evade nearly all people?"26 Manent's Augustinian formulated
response directs attention to the fact that man seeks wholeness and
perfection as a whole being, a whole being whose perfection stands not in
isolation from the members of all the other nations, as Judaism's
distinctive claim to be the one chosen people does, or from the
nondialectical many, as classical philosophy's exaggerated claim about the
radical superiority of the Socratic philosopher does. On the contrary, it
speaks of a form of graced perfection conferred on and attained by a
concrete person that the human being necessarily holds in solidarity with
all human beings inasmuch as they too are created human beings called to
perfection in (and by) God.
Manent argues that one gains further insight into this problem if he
takes into consideration not simply its Greek philosophic and Hebraic
formulations, but also modem democracy's purported solution to the
problem of the one and the many. Viewed from this fuller ancient/modem
dialectical perspective, "Christianity instead of being simply a 'synthesis' is
[seen to be] in the position of a 'middle term' between the Jewish and
Greek 'separations' on the one hand and the unification or 'maximum
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synthesis' of the Modems on the other." 27 Perhaps here is a good and, I
have no doubt, provocative place for me to stop.

: Marc D. Guerra is associate professor and chair of the department of
., theology at Assumption College in Worcester, Massachusetts. He is the
author of Christians as Political Animals: Taking the Measure of
'-;.:"·
Modernity and Modem Democracy (ISi Books, 2010), and editor of
c; Reason,
Revelation, and Human Affairs (Lexington Books, 2001),
: Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome: Essays in Honor of James V. Schall, S.J .
.: .\ (St. Augustine's Press, 2013), and Pope Benedict XVI and the Politics of
, ; Modernity (Routledge, 2013).
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